In this paper, we consider a risk-averse control problem for diffusion processes, in which there is a partition of the admissible control strategy into two decision-making groups (namely, the leader and follower) with different cost functionals and risk-averse satisfactions. Our approach, based on a hierarchical optimization framework, requires that a certain level of risk-averse satisfaction be achieved for the leader as a priority over that of the follower's risk-averseness. In particular, we formulate such a risk-averse control problem involving a family of time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures induced by conditional g-expectations (i.e., filtration-consistent nonlinear expectations associated with the generators of certain backward stochastic differential equations). Moreover, under suitable conditions, we establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity solutions, for the corresponding risk-averse dynamic programming equations. Finally, we briefly comment on the implication of our results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Let Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P be a probability space, and let {B t } t≥0 be a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion, whose natural filtration, augmented by all P-null sets, is denoted by {F t } t≥0 , so that it satisfies the usual hypotheses (e.g., see [1] or [2] ). We consider the following controlleddiffusion process over a given finite-time horizon T > 0 dX t = f t, X t , u t dt + σ t, X t , u t dB t , X 0 = x, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where
• u · is a U-valued measurable admissible control process (where U is a compact set in 
for some λ > 0.
In this paper, we specifically consider a hierarchical risk-averse control problem for the above controlled-diffusion process in (1) , in which there is a partition of the admissible control strategy into two decision making groups (i.e., progressively measurable strategies corresponding to the leader and follower -where such notions are used in the Stackelberg's optimization [3] ) with different cost functionals and risk-averse satisfactions. In particular, we partition the control subdomain U into two open sets V and W that are compatible with the strategy subspaces of the leader and the follower, respectively. More specifically, the risk-averse strategy for the leader v · is a V -valued measurable control process from the set V 
respectively.
Furthermore, we consider the following two cost functionals that provide information about the accumulated risk-costs on the time interval [0, T ] w.r.t. the strategies of the leader and that of the follower, i.e.,
leader's accumulated risk-cost:
and follower's accumulated risk-cost:
where the cost-rate functionals c 1 : associated with risk-averse satisfaction levels) and they are assumed to be measurable functions.
Here, we also assume that f , σ, c i and Ψ i , i = 1, 2, satisfy the following growth conditions
and
for all t, x, (v, w)
Then, we state the following lemma, which is used to establish the existence of a unique adapted solution (e.g., see [4] for additional discussions).
Lemma 1.2:
Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds. Then, for any ξ ∈ L 2 Ω, F T , P; R , the BSDE in (8) , with terminal condition Y T = ξ, i.e.,
has a unique adapted solution
Moreover, we recall the following comparison result that will be useful later (e.g., see [5] ).
Theorem 1.3:
Given two generators g 1 and g 2 satisfying Assumption 1.1 and two terminal con-
t be the solution pairs corresponding to ξ 1 , g 1 and ξ 2 , g 2 , respectively. Then, we have
(ii) Strictly Monotonicity: In addition to (i) above, if we assume that P ξ 1 > ξ 2 > 0, then
In the following, we give a definition for a dynamic risk measure that is associated with the generator of the BSDE in (8) .
be the unique solution to the BSDE in (8) with terminal condition Y T = ξ. Then, we define the
1 Note that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], the conditional g-expectation of ξ ∈ L 2 Ω, FT , P; R w.r.t. Ft (denoted by Eg ξ|Ft (e.g., see [6] or [7] ; cf. [8] )) is also defined by
Moreover, if ξ is Ft-measurable, then we have Eg ξ|Ft = ξ. Note that such a risk measure is widely used for evaluating the risk of stochastic processes or uncertain outcomes, and assists with stipulating minimum interventions required by financial institutions for risk management (e.g., see [9] , [7] , [10] , [11] , [12] or [13] for related discussions).
In Section II, we use a family of dynamic risk measures associated that takes into account the leader's and follower's cost functionals and risk-averse satisfactions; and we further provide a hierarchical framework for the risk-averse control problem.
Moreover, if the generator function g satisfies Assumption 1.1, then a family of time-consistent dynamic risk measures ρ
has the following properties (e.g., see [7] for additional discussions).
Property 1:
Remark 1.5: Note that, since the seminal work of Artzner et al. [9] , there have been studies on axiomatic dynamic risk measures, coherency and consistency in the literature (e.g., see [12] , [7] , [6] , [11] or [13] ). Particularly relevant for us is a family of time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures, based on the conditional g-expectations associated with the generators of BSDEs in (19) and (20) , that satisfy the above properties (P1)-(P5).
Here, it is worth mentioning that some interesting studies on the dynamic risk measures, based on the conditional g-expectations, have been reported in the literature (e,g. see [7] , [13] and [6] for establishing connection between the risk measures and the generator of BSDE; and see also [14] for characterizing the generator of BSDE according to different risk measures).
Recently, the authors in [15] and [16] (see also [17] ) have provided interesting results on the riskaverse control problem for Markov decision processes, in discrete-time setting, and, respectively, for controlled-diffusion processes in continuous-time framework. Note that the rationale behind our framework, which follows in some sense the settings of these papers, is to show how a hierarchical optimization framework can be systematically used to obtain optimal risk-averse strategies for such controlled-diffusion processes. 2 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, using the basic remarks made in Section I, we state the risk-averse control problem for the controlled-diffusion process.
In Section III, we present our main results -where we introduce a framework under which the follower is required to respond optimally to the risk-averse strategy of the leader so as to achieve an overall optimal risk-averseness. In this section, we also establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity solutions, to the associated risk-averse dynamic programming equations. Finally, Section IV provides further remarks.
II. THE HIERARCHICAL RISK-AVERSE CONTROL PROBLEM FORMULATION
In order to make our formulation more precise, for any
2 In this paper, our intent is to provide a theoretical framework, rather than considering a specific numerical problem or application. 8 where v · and w · are V -and W -valued measurable control processes, respectively. Moreover, we introduce the following two risk-value functions w.r.t. the strategies of the leader and that of the follower, i.e.,
with u = (v,ŵ); and similarly
wherev · ∈ V [t,T ] is assumed to be known to the follower and
with u = (v, w).
Note that we can express the above risk-value functions in (13) and (15) as follow
with u = (v, w) -where the generators g 1 and g 2 are assumed to satisfy Assumption 1.1. Further, noting the conditions in (6) and (7) 
In what follows, we introduce a hierarchical optimization framework that requires a certain level of risk-averse satisfaction be achieved for the leader as a priority over that of the follower's risk-averseness. For example, suppose that the risk-averse strategy of the
is given. 3 Then, the problem of finding an optimal risk-averse strategy for the follower, i.e.,
, which minimizes the accumulated risk-cost under w is then reduced to finding an optimal risk-averse solution for
Note that, for a givenv · ∈ V [t,T ] , if the forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) in (12), (19) and (20) admit weak solutions, then we havê
for some (nonanticipating) measurable mapping S :
. Furthermore, if we substitute 
Next, we introduce the definition of admissible hierarchical risk-averse control system
which provides a logical construct for our main results (e.g., see [18] ).
Definition 2.1:
For a given finite-time horizon T > 0, we call Σ [t,T ] an admissible hierarchical risk-averse control system, if it satisfies the following conditions:
• Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P is a complete probability space;
, where
• There exists at least one measurable mapping S :
• For any x ∈ R d , the FBSDEs in (12), (19) and (20) 
where S is a unique measurable mapping that maps V [0,T ] onto W [0,T ] and, furthermore, the accumulated risk-costs J 1 and J 2 over the time-interval [0, T ] are given
where X 0,x;u * 0 = x and u * = (v * , w * ), with w * · ∈ S(v * · ).
In the following section, we establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity solutions, for the optimization problems in (26) and (27) with restriction to
Note that, for a given v · ∈ V [0,T ] , the optimization problem in (27) has a unique solution on
. Furthermore, as we will see later (particularly in Proposition 3.9), the problem in (26) makes sense if the follower is involved not only in minimizing his own accumulated risk-cost (in response to the risk-averse strategy of the leader) but also in minimizing that of the leader.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results, where we establish the existence of optimal riskaverse solutions, in the sense of viscosity solutions, to the associated risk-averse dynamic programming equations (cf. equations (48) and (69)).
We now state the following propositions that will be useful for proving our main results later in Subsections III-A and III-B.
Proposition 3.1: Suppose Assumption 1.1 together with (6) and (7) hold. Then, for any
, the FBSDEs in (12), (19) and (20) admit unique adapted solutions
Furthermore, the risk-values w.r.t. the leader and follower, i.e., V Then, the forward SDEs in (19) and (20) 
Proposition 3.2:
Proof: For any r ∈ [t, T ], with t ∈ [0, T ], we consider the following probability space Ω, F , P ·|F t r , {F t } and notice that η is deterministic under this probability space. Then, for any s ≥ r, there exist progressively measurable processes ψ 1 and ψ 2 such that
whereB s = B s − B r is a standard d-dimensional brownian motion. Note that the pairs v · , w · are F t r -adapted processes, then we have the following restriction w.r.t.
where ω ′ ∈ Ω ′ such that Ω ′ ∈ F , with P(Ω ′ ) = 1. Furthermore, noting Lemma 1.2, if we work under the probability space Ω ′ , F , P ·|F In what follows, we restrict our discussion when the generators g 1 and g 2 depend only on
we introduce the following second-order linear operators 5 , associated with (12), as follows
where a v (t, x) = σ(t, x, (v, S(v)))σ T (t, x, (v, S(v))) and S is the mapping that satisfies (23);
the gradient and the Hessian (w.r.t. the variable x), respectively. Furthermore, on the space
we consider the following coupled HamiltonJacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential equations 
wherev is assumed to be given
with, respectively, the following boundary conditions
Note that the above equations in (39) and (40) (28) and (29) . Moreover, they represent generalized HJB equations with additional terms g 1 and g 2 , respectively. Note that the problem of FBSDEs (cf. equations (12), (19) and (20)) and the solvability of the corresponding HJB partial differential equations have been well studied in literature (e.g., see [19] , [20] , [18] , [21] , [5] , [22] and [23] ).
Next, we recall the definitions of viscosity solutions for (39) and (40) together with (41) (e.g., see [24] , [25] or [26] for additional discussions on the notion of viscosity solutions). 
and for
e., a local maximum at (t 0 , x 0 )), then we have
(ii) for every
e., a local minimum at (t 0 , x 0 )), then we have
A. On the risk-averse optimality condition for the follower
Note that, for a givenv · ∈ V [t,T ] (i.e., a risk-averse strategy for the leader's with restriction to Σ [t,T ] ), if the risk-averse strategy for the follower is an optimal solution to (18) (cf. equations (15) and (27)), then such a solution is characterized by the following propositions (i.e., Propositions 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7).
Proposition 3.4:
Suppose that Assumption 1.1 together with (6) and (7) hold. Letv · ∈ V [t,T ] be given, then the risk-value function w.r.t. the follower is given by
Further, if we applying the properties of time-consistency and translation (cf. Property 1) to Vw 2 t, x , then we have 
Since ǫ is arbitrary, we obtain (48). On the other hand, to show the reverse inequality " ≤ ", letw · (which is restricted to Σ [t,T ] ) be an ǫ-optimal solution, for some fixed ǫ > 0, to the the problem on the right-hand side of (48 
Then, for every 
Moreover, if there exists at least oneŵ satisfying (65), then, for w =ŵ, the inequality in (68) becomes an equality (i.e., κ(t, x) = Vŵ 2 t, x ). Note that the corresponding pathwise solution X t,x;û s , withû = (v,ŵ) andŵ = S(v), is progressively measurable, since the control procesŝ
. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.7.
B. On the risk-averse optimality condition for the leader
In this subsection, we provide an optimality condition on the risk-averseness of the leader in (24) (cf. equations (26) and (13)), when the risk-averse strategy for the follower satisfies the optimality condition of Proposition 3.7. 
with boundary condition 
Then,
Proof:
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.7, except that we require a unique solution set X (19) and (20) on
Here, we remark that the above condition in (70) requires the follower to respond optimally to the risk-averse strategy of the leader, where such a correspondence is implicitly embedded via the mapping S (cf. equation (65)). Furthermore, the optimal risk-averse strategies v * · and S(v * · ) are interpreted in the sense of viscosity for the corresponding risk-averse dynamic programming equations in (48) and (69).
IV. FURTHER REMARKS
In this section, we briefly comment on the implication of our results in assessing the influence of the leader's decision and its risk-averse satisfaction on the risk-averseness of the follower in relation to the direction of leader-follower information flow. Note that, for the optimization problems in (26) and (27) , if there exist: (i) a nonanticipating measurable mapping S :
and (ii) a risk-averse strategy for the leader v * · ∈ V [0,T ] that satisfies
is an optimal risk-averse strategy. Moreover, we observe that the statement of Proposition 3.7 is implicitly accounted in Proposition 3.9. That is, for any where such a strategy is also implicitly conditioned by the follower's risk-averse strategy and its risk-averse satisfaction. As a result of this, the follower is involved not only in minimizing his own accumulated risk-cost (in response to the risk-averse strategy of the leader) but also in minimizing that of the leader's accumulated risk-cost. Hence, such an inherent interaction, due to the nature of the problem, constitutes a constrained information flow between the leader and that of the follower, in which the follower is required to respond optimally, in the sense of best-response correspondence, to the risk-averse strategy of the leader. [0, T ]; R d is a measurable function and B t is a d-dimensional brownian motion. Then, the process h can be used as a device to transform P into another probability distribution Q which is mutually absolutely continuous w.r.t. P on Ω, F (e.g., see Girsavov [28] for additional discussions on transforming stochastic processes).
Moreover, if we specify the model uncertainty in terms of the relative entropy between Q and P as a single constraint on the entire path of perturbation. Then, by considering h as an adversarial control process in a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game (in the sense of Elliot and
Kalton [29] ), we can reformulate the optimization problem in (22) as an "min-max" problem with uncertainty-aversion between the follower and that of the adversary (e.g., see [30] or [31] for related discussions, but in a different context).
